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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986): 
(1) "Person" includes any individual 
firm, copartnership, joint adventure, 
corporation, estate, or trust, or any group 
or combination acting as a unit and the 
plural as well as the singular number unless 
the intention to give a more limited meaning 
is disclosed by the context. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) (1986): 
(4) Each vendor shall, on or before 
the last day of the month next succeeding 
each calendar quarterly period, file with 
the commission a return for the preceding 
quarterly period. The return shall be 
accompanied by a remittance of the amount of 
tax required under this chapter to be 
collected by the vendor for the period 
covered by the return. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1992): 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be 
interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, 
for good cause shown, from lengthening or 
shortening any time period prescribed in 
this chapter, except those time periods 
established for judicial review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1988): 
(1)(a) Within 20 days after the date that 
an order is issued for which review by the 
agency or by a superior agency under Section 
63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order 
would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request 
for reconsideration with the agency, stating 
the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by 
statute, filing of the request [for 
reconsideration] is not a prerequisite for 
seeking judicial review of an order. 
-iv-
(3)(a) The agency head, or a person 
designated for that purpose, shall issue a 
written order granting the request or 
denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person 
designated for the purpose does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the 
request, the request for reconsideration 
shall be considered to be denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1988): 
(3)(a) A party shall file a petition for 
judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action is 
issued or is considered to have been issued 
under Subsection 63-46b-13(b). 
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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On September 28, 1990, Petitioners received 
certain Statutory Notice from the Auditing Division of the State 
Tax Commission indicating tax deficiencies for audit periods 
ranging from October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988. (R. 685-96) 
2. Each of the four Petitioners received a separate 
notice and tax assessment with Harper Excavating, Inc. having 
the most significant tax liability of $696,543.41. (R. 685-96) 
3. On October 26, 1990, Richard C. Skeen filed a 
Petition for Redetermination with the Tax Commission. Thomas E. 
Nelson assisted Mr. Skeen with the petition. (R. 669) 
4. Prior to the formal hearing before the Tax 
Commission, Richard C. Skeen and Robert A. Peterson were 
identified as the primary attorneys for Petitioners on virtually 
all of the documentation filed by Petitioners with the 
Commission. (R. 215-696) 
5. Richard C. Skeen and Robert A. Peterson were the 
attorneys who tried Petitioners' claims before the Tax 
Commission in the formal hearing on July 30, 1991. (R. 207) 
6. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tax 
Commission took the matter under advisement. (Transcript at 
152) 
7. On January 9, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. (R. 
207) 
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8. According to the mailing certificate attached to 
the Final Decision, the decision was mailed to Petitioners as 
follows: 
Harper Investment, Inc. 
c/o Thomas E. Nelson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Though the decision affected each of Petitioners individually 
and differently, the mailing certificate named only one of the 
four Petitioners to the action and did not identify Harper 
Excavating, Inc., the petitioner with the greatest tax 
liability. Moreover, the mailing certificate was not sent to 
Richard C. Skeen or Robert A. Peterson, the primary attorneys to 
the action. In fact, no notice was sent to Van Cott, Bagley per 
se. The notice was allegedly sent in care of Van Cott, Bagley 
to one of the four Petitioners. (R. 214) 
9. Despite the assertion made in the mailing 
certificate, none of the Petitioners or their counsel received a 
copy of the Final Decision until February 20, 1992, forty-two 
(42) days after the decision was issued. (R. 64-67, 181-206) 
10. On February 20, 1992, the taxing authorities 
arrived at Petitioners' place of business, delivered a copy of 
the Final Decision to Petitioners, and attempted to collect the 
judgment of nearly one million dollars. This was the first 
notice that Petitioners or their counsel received of the 
decision. Petitioners immediately notified their counsel of the 
decision. (R. 64-67) 
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11. On February 24, 1992, Petitioners filed a motion 
with the Tax Commission requesting the Commission to extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal. Petitioners relied upon the 
fact that they did not receive notice of the Final Decision 
until after the date for filing a petition had passed. 
Petitioners' relied upon Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) 
in their motion. (R. 165) 
12. Petitioners filed seven affidavits in support of 
their motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
including the affidavits of Robert A. Peterson, Richard C. 
Skeen, Thomas E. Nelson, Robert W. Payne Kerry L. Warr, Paul L. 
Miles and Steven Karsten. These are the only individuals who 
would have seen a copy of the Final Decision allegedly mailed by 
the Tax Commission. The affidavits carefully traced Van Cott, 
Bagley's mail distribution procedures with respect to Tom Nelson 
after he left the firm. Each of the affiants signed the 
affidavits under oath stating that they never saw a copy of the 
Final Decision of the Tax Commission until on or after February 
20, 1992. (R. 64-67, 181-206) 
13. In its memorandum in opposition to Petitioners' 
motion, Respondent argued that Rule 4(e) does not govern 
proceedings before the Tax Commission. (R. 68) 
14. On March 13, 1992, Petitioners filed their reply 
memorandum and an amended motion specifically requesting the 
Commission to extend the time to file a Petition for 
-3-
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Reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). 
(R. 40, 44) 
15. On April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission granted 
Petitioners' request for an extension of time to file a Petition 
for Reconsideration. (R. 30) 
16. On May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed their Petition 
for Reconsideration. (R. 11) 
17. Respondent did not reply to Petitioners' Petition 
for Reconsideration. 
18. On June 3, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its 
final order denying the Petition for Reconsideration. (R. 8) 
19. On July 1, 1992, Petitioners filed a Petition for 
Review of Agency Action with this Court. (R. 2) 
ARGUMENTS 
I. PETITIONERS' APPEAL TO THIS COURT WAS TIMELY. 
Respondent presents three arguments in support of its 
position that Petitioners' appeal was not timely. First, 
Respondent asserts that this appeal is untimely because 
Petitioners' did not appeal the Final Decision of the Commission 
within thirty (30) days of the date the decision was issued. 
Second, Respondent argues that the appeal was untimely because 
the Commission's order extending the time to file a Petition for 
Reconsideration could not extend the time for judicial appeal. 
Third, respondent argues that the appeal is untimely because 
Petitioners did not appeal within twenty (20) days after 
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submitting their Petition for Reconsideration. Respondents will 
deal with each of these arguments. 
A. The Commission Appropriately Extended The 
Time To File A Petition For Reconsideration. 
The Utah Code clearly grants to the Tax Commission the 
authority to extend the time for filing a Petition for 
Reconsideration "for good cause shown." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-l(9) (1992). Moreover, 
an administrative agency should be allowed a 
comparatively wide latitude of discretion in 
performing its responsibilities [and] courts 
should not intrude or interfere therewith 
unless the action is so oppressive or 
unreasonable that it must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary, or the agency has 
in some way acted contrary to law or in 
excess of its authority. 
Petty v. Utah State Bd. of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Utah 
1979) . 
Good cause existed in this case for at least two 
reasons. First, and most importantly, neither Petitioners nor 
their counsel received actual notice of the Final Decision until 
forty-two (42) days after the decision had been issued. This 
Court has recognized that "due process requires that notice of 
the judgment be given to defendant or his right to appeal is 
abridged severely." Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 309, 
311 (Utah 1979). * Second, the notice which was purportedly 
1
 Petitioners thoroughly briefed the constitutional 
implications of notice in their Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Amended Motion For Relief to Challenge the Final Decision of the 
Tax Commission. (R. 51-58) 
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mailed to Petitioners identified only one of the four 
Petitioners and was not mailed to either of the attorneys who 
were primarily responsible for the case. Although Respondent 
does not specifically challenge the Tax Commission's "good 
cause" extension of time for Petitioners to file a Petition for 
Reconsideration, it is clear that the extension was 
appropriately granted. 
B. The Extension Of Time To File A Petition For 
Reconsideration Did Not Lengthen The Time 
Period Prescribed In Which To Seek Judicial 
Review Of A Final Agency Action. 
Respondent incorrectly assumes that the extension of 
time granted to Petitioner to file their Petition for 
Reconsideration also extended the "time periods established for 
judicial review" prohibited by § 63-46b-l(9). The 
Administrative Procedures Act identifies a specific thirty-day 
time period for Judicial Review which begins to run at different 
periods of time depending upon whether or not a petitioner first 
seeks reconsideration from the administrative agency. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(b) (1988) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1988), a petitioner may seek immediate 
Judicial Review within thirty days of a final decision and 
forego any further agency action. Alternatively, a petitioner 
may, within twenty days of the decision, request the 
administrative agency to reconsider its decision pursuant to 
section Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1988).2 When a 
2
 The Decision of the commission in this case specifically 
recognized these alternative avenues of review. 
-6-
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petitioner chooses the latter option, the time for filing a 
notice of Judicial Review is tolled during the pendency of the 
Agency Review. See, e.g.. Bridger Coal Co./Pac. Minerals. Inc. 
v. Director. 927 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1991) (motion for 
reconsideration tolls time for filing notice of appeal); United 
Transp. Union v. I. C. C.. 871 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(pending petition renders underlying action non-final). 
Petitioner may then seek Judicial Review of the initial agency 
decision within thirty days of the agency's final order on, or 
deemed denial of, the request for reconsideration. § 63-46b-
14(3) (a) . 
In this case, Petitioners sought and obtained a "good 
cause" extension of time to seek Agency Review.3 Section 63-
46b-l(9) expressly allows the Commission the discretion to grant 
such an extension of time. Any "good cause" extension of time 
to seek Agency Review will inevitably toll the commencement of 
the time period for subsequent Judicial Review and section 63-
46b-l(9) does not prohibit that tolling. Respondent has cited 
no authority to the contrary. 
Respondent cites Dusty's. Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992), however, Dusty's has no 
application to the issues in this case. In Dusty's. the 
petitioner failed to file any kind of petition for review until 
thirty-three days after the date that the Commission's decision 
3
 It is significant to note that Respondent has never 
challenged the "good cause" extension granted by the Tax 
Commission. 
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was issued. The petitioner did not seek an extension of time 
from the Commission or from the court, but rather, argued that 
the thirty-day time period for Judicial Review ran from the date 
that the tax decision was received. This Court held that the 
time period ran from the date issued rather than from the date 
received. Id. at 870. Significantly, this Court stated: "Most 
importantly, [the notice] gave Dusty's actual and constructive 
notice, and Dusty's ignored that notice at its peril." Id. 
Here, unlike in Dusty's. Petitioners did not receive any notice 
of the Commission's Final Decision until after the appeal 
periods had run and then acted immediately upon the notice they 
received. 
The next case relied upon by Respondent is Hase v. 
Hase, 775 P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Hase, appellant was 
issued and received notice of a final judgment but failed to 
file an appeal from the judgment within thirty days thereafter. 
Appellant asserted that the appeal could be taken from a later 
order of the court which merely reiterated the court's earlier 
final order. The court of appeals noted that the district 
court's subsequent order could not "be used to extend the time 
for appeal because it [did] not resolve any issues extant, but 
merely [referred] to prior orders of the court." Id. at 945. 
Respondent erroneously equates the later order in Hase with the 
Commission's order on the Petition for Reconsideration in this 
case. Unlike in Hase, the Commission's order resolved an issue 
extant--the Petition for Reconsideration. It is true that the 
-8-
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Commission declined to change its decision, however, Petitioners 
had the statutory right to seek such a review pursuant to § 63-
46b-13(l)(a) and the Commission had the discretion to grant the 
extension of time in which to seek the reconsideration. 
The appellant in Hase also argued that: an "Objection 
to Order" filed fifteen days after the judgment suspended the 
finality of the judgment. The court of appeals first noted that 
the objection was not specifically based upon any rule of 
procedure. Id. The court then treated the objection as a Rule 
52(b) motion which had to be filed within 10 days of the 
judgment to suspend the finality of the judgment. Id. There 
was no suggestion in Hase that appellant had grounds for 
seeking, had sought or had obtained an extension of time to file 
its objection. In this case, unlike Hase, Petitioners had good 
cause for an extension of time to seek Agency Review, sought an 
extension of time pursuant to § 63-46b-l(9) and obtained an 
extension from the Commission before filing its Petition for 
Reconsideration pursuant to § 63-46b-13(l)(a). Hase is clearly 
distinguishable from the facts before this Court. 
Respondent also cites Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1982) and Vanjonora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 
1320 (1974). In each of these cases, the appellant filed an 
untimely motion for a new trial. As in Hase, there was no 
suggestion that appellants had grounds for seeking, had sought 
or had obtained extensions of time from the district courts to 
-9-
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file an untimely motion for a new trial. Therefore, these cases 
have no application to this case. 
Another case cited by Respondent is Isaacson v. 
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). In Isaacson, the issue was 
whether mailing of a notice of appeal constituted filing within 
the meaning of the statute. The court held that it did not. 
Id. at 851. No similar issue exists in this case and Isaacson 
does nothing to further Respondent's contentions. 
Finally, Respondent cites three federal cases in which 
appellants had filed untimely or deficient rule 59 (e) motions to 
alter or amend a decision of the federal district court. See 
Denley v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 
1984) (untimely motion); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 
1988) (untimely motion); Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (deficient motion). In each of these cases, the 
courts recognized that although timely and sufficient 59(e) 
motions would toll the appellant's time to appeal, untimely 
motions would not, and the district courts did not have 
discretion to extend the parties' time for filing rule 59(e) 
motions. See Denley, 733 F.2d at 41; Smith, 853 F.2d at 57-58; 
Martinez, 556 F.2d at 819-820. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is similar to a 
Petition for Reconsideration in that both vehicles toll the time 
for appeal when timely filed. They differ, however, in that a 
district court has no discretion to extend the time for filing a 
rule 59(e) motion, whereas, the Commission has the express 
i o ? \ •*«;:>?*; 1 
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statutory authority to extend the time to file a Petition for 
Reconsideration. Because of this important distinction, the 
federal cases cited by Respondent do not serve as authority for 
this case. 
Section 63-46b-1(9) simply prohibits the agency from 
extending the thirty-day period for Judicial Review. 
Petitioners did not seek, nor did the Commission grant, such an 
extension. Within days of learning about the Tax Commission's 
January 9, 1992, decision, Petitioners sought an extension of 
the twenty-day period for filing a notice of Agency Review. On 
April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission concluded that "good cause" 
existed under the facts of this case and granted Petitioners' 
request for an extension. On May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed 
their Petition for Reconsideration. The thirty-day time period 
for seeking judicial review was tolled, not extended, until June 
3, 1992, when the Tax Commission issued its final order denying 
the Petition for Reconsideration. Petitioners timely filed 
their notice of Judicial Review within thirty (30) days of the 
written order denying the Petition for Reconsideration. 
C. Petitioners Timely Filed Their Petition For 
Judicial Review Of The Final Agency Action 
Pursuant To S 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) provides: " A Party shall 
file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or is considered to have been 
issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)." Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The written final 
order of the Tax Commission was issued on June 3, 1992. 
Pursuant to the express language of § 63-46-14(3)(a), 
Petitioners filed their Petition for Review of Agency Action on 
July 1, 1992, "30 days after the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action [was] issued." Id. 
Respondent argues that Petitioners were required to 
file their appeal within thirty days of the twenty day period 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1988) rather than 
from the actual date of the written order. Section 
63-46b-14(3)(a) does not require this result. The statute 
requires a petitioner to file the appeal within thirty days of 
the date that the order is issued or from the date that it is 
considered to have been issued under § 63-46b-13(3)(b). It does 
not limit the filing of the appeal to the sooner of those two 
dates. Had the Tax Commission failed to issue any written order 
on Petitioners Petition for Reconsideration, Petitioners would 
have filed their Petition for Agency Review on or before June 
23, 1992. However, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
13(3) (a) (1988), the Tax Commission in fact issued a written 
final order on June 3, 1992. Petitioners timely filed their 
appeal within thirty days of that written order as required by 
the § 63-46b-13(3)(b). Therefore, Petitioners appeal was timely 
filed and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 
103X7533*; 1 
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II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT NO DEFERENCE TO THE 
DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION AND REVIEW THAT 
DECISION FOR CORRECTNESS. 
This Court should grant Petitioners the relief 
requested because they have been "substantially prejudiced" by 
the Tax Commission's erroneous interpretation and application of 
the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). In reviewing 
the decision of the Tax Commission, this Court must construe the 
facts in favor of the agency's findings. Hales Sand and Gravel 
v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n. 842 P„2d 887, 889 
(Utah 1992). However, the Court should "grant no such deference 
to the agency's interpretation or application of law," but 
rather, review it "for correctness." Id. Although Respondent 
attempts to color this appeal as a dispute of facts, Petitioners 
are not disputing the factual findings of the Commission and 
only challenge the Commission's interpretation of the law and 
the application of the law to the undisputed facts. Therefore, 
this Court must give no deference to the legal conclusions of 
the Commission and review them for correctness. Id. 
III. PETITIONERS REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THEY WERE A 
"GROUP OR COMBINATION ACTING AS A UNIT," AN ISSUE 
NOT PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT. 
As fully discussed in their opening brief, Petitioners 
examined the language of the sales and use tax statutes and 
reasonably concluded that they were a "group or combination 
acting as a unit" for purposes of collecting and paying sales 
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tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986).l As such, they filed 
consolidated sales tax returns and did not consider sales tax on 
intra-unit transactions. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) (1986).2 
This opinion was shared by the controller who first worked for 
Petitioners during and after the reorganization, by the 
controller who succeeded to that position and by the independent 
auditors who prepared audited financial statements for the 
Petitioners. This Court should follow its practice and construe 
the "taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, 
leaving to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more 
restrictive if such intent exists." Salt Lake County v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989). See also Hales 
Sand and Gravel v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 842 
P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992) (Court should "construe taxing 
statutes in favor of taxpayer and against taxing authority"). 
In response to this argument, Respondent cites to the 
cases of Institutional Laundry, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985) and Hales Sand and Gravel v. Auditing 
Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). These 
cases do not govern the outcome of the issues in this case. The 
most significant distinction between Respondent's cases and the 
appeal before this Court is that the petitioners in 
Section 59-15-2(1) is quoted in its entirety in the 
Determinative Statutes section of this brief. 
2
 Section 59-15-5(4) is quoted in its entirety in the 
Determinative Statutes section of this brief. 
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Institutional Laundry and Hase did not reasonably rely upon the 
language of the taxing statutes in determining their tax 
liability. More specifically, the petitioners in those cases 
did not claim to be "group or combination acting as a unit" 
within the meaning of the Sales and Use Tax Act. 
In Institutional Laundry, a subsidiary corporation was 
created to provide laundry services on an non-profit basis for 
the parent corporation. 706 P.2d at 1067. The petitioner 
argued that, as a wholly owned subsidiary, Institutional Laundry 
had no real separate corporate existence and, therefore was 
exempt from tax. Id. This Court rejected that argument holding 
that the "corporation may not disregard or shed its corporate 
clothing to avoid tax consequences." Id. As a general rule, 
Petitioners agree with this proposition. Moreover, Petitioners 
have not argued and do not argue that they lack separate 
corporate identities. Instead, Petitioners argue that they 
consulted the relevant tax statutes and reasonably concluded 
that they were a "group or combination acting as a unit" for 
purposes of sales tax. This argument was not asserted or 
decided in Institutional Laundry and, therefore, that case 
should not govern the outcome of this case. 
With respect to the Hales case, it should first be 
noted that the main issue before this Court was whether Hales 
was obligated to pay tax on its costs to transport gravel 
materials to all of its customers. 842 P.2d at 890-894. That 
question is not at issue in the instant case. The only issue 
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even remotely related to this case was a claim by Hales that it 
did not have to pay taxes on sales to another corporation, JTN, 
formed by four of the shareholders of Hales to perform federal 
contracts. Id. at 894-895. As in Institutional Laundry, Hales 
claimed that it and JTN were the same entity and did not have to 
pay sales tax. Hales took this position because the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") had concluded that the two 
corporations were a single construction subcontractor for 
purposes of federal labor law.3 Id. at 894. This Court 
concluded that UDOT's determinations were not binding on the Tax 
Commission and that the federal labor law criteria were 
inapplicable to the determination of tax liability. Id. at 894-
95. 
The claims and analysis in Hales are clearly different 
from the claims and analysis in this case. Petitioners are not 
claiming to be the same legal entity. Moreover, Petitioners are 
not relying upon another agency's determinations of their 
status, but instead, upon the Commission's own statutes and 
regulations that were reasonably interpreted by Petitioners and 
led them to act as they did. Hales should not govern the 
outcome of this case.4 
It should be noted that Hales in fact paid sales taxes 
on the gravel sales to JTN and sought a reimbursement of those 
taxes only after UDOT concluded that the corporations were a 
single construction subcontractor. Hales, 842 P.2d at 894. 
4
 It should also be noted that Respondent has only relied 
upon Hales to confront Petitioners' claim that they are a "group 
or combination acting as a unit." Respondent has not relied upon 
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Respondent also relies upon the doctrine of "ejusdem 
generis" to rebut Petitioners' arguments. Petitioners do not 
disagree with Respondent's analysis of this rule of construction 
and are somewhat confused as to why Respondent relies upon the 
rule. Literally, "ejusdem generis" means "of the same class." 
Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City Suburban 
Sanitary District. 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1987). The rule is 
"designed to save the legislature from spelling out in advance 
every contingency in which the statute could apply." 2A Norman 
J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 47.17 (5th Ed. 1992). 
The best way to understand this doctrine is to see its 
operation in a particular case. In Ponderosa, Salt Lake City 
claimed that Ponderosa's action to recover sewer service charges 
was barred by a six month statute of limitations covering "all 
cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public 
revenue." Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 (1986). The court applied 
the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" and concluded that, unlike 
taxes and licenses which are revenue raising measures, sewer 
Hales to rebut Petitioners' second argument concerning the true 
ownership of the gravel materials allegedly sold. This is 
probably because Hales supports Petitioners' second argument. The 
Hales court recognizes that "passage of title is the moment upon 
which the transaction is to be valued for purposes of the tax." 
Hales, 842 P.2d at 891. As will be discussed in greater detail, 
Petitioners assert that title always remained in Harper 
Contracting and therefore, title never passed from Harper 
Excavating to Harper Contracting. Consequently, according to 
Hales, since no passage of title ever occurred, no taxable event 
occurred. 
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charges are payments for services and not of the same class. 
Ponderosa, 738 P.2d at 637. Cf. Fields v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (legal 
pleadings are not "similar in nature to reports, tax returns and 
claims against the state.") 
In this case, Petitioners reasonably concluded that 
they were a group or combination of corporations acting as a 
unit. As discussed in their opening brief, Petitioners 
continued to operate as they had done before the reorganization. 
They continued to present themselves to the public as a unit, 
typically bid jobs as a unit, were insured as a unit, obtained 
bonding as a unit and were dependent upon each other for their 
continuing operation. (R. 646; Transcript at 23-25, 34, 56 & 
104-108). In these respects, they are similar in nature to the 
specifically enumerated entities though not technically one of 
those entities.5 Therefore, the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" 
in fact supports Petitioners' arguments. 
Respondent argues that because each petitioner is a 
corporation and "person" within the language of the tax statutes 
they cannot also be a member of a "group or combination acting as 
a unit." This argument is nonsensical. Section 59-15-2(1) states 
that partnerships and joint ventures are also "persons" within the 
meaning of the sales tax statutes. Partnerships, joint ventures 
and associations are frequently comprised of individuals, other 
partnerships and corporations. Respondent cannot argue that 
because an individual, partnership or corporation is a "person" 
within the tax statutes it cannot also be a member of another 
partnership, joint venture or association which is also a "person" 
under the statutes, otherwise, the reference to partnerships and 
joint ventures in the statute would be meaningless. By the same 
token, Petitioners can be separate corporations and still be 
members of the "unit" for purposes of sales tax. 
-18-
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Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioners' right to 
file a consolidated sales tax return is irrelevant to their 
sales and use tax liability citing Savage Industries, Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). Savage has no 
application to this case because it deals with the calculation 
of income tax and the deduction of net loss carryovers by one 
corporation acquiring another corporation under the income tax 
statutes. This case, on the other hand, deals with the 
collection and payment of sales tax under the Sales and Use Tax 
Act. The same sales tax statute that requires the vendor/person 
to collect and remit sales tax requires that vendor/person to 
file a return on a quarterly basis. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) 
(1986). The statute makes no distinction between the 
vendor/person for purpose of collecting and remitting the tax 
and for purposes of filing the return. 
Despite Respondent's contentions, the Commission, in 
its prehearing order, implicitly recognized that if Petitioners 
were a "group or combination acting as a unit" for one purpose 
then they were a "group or combination acting as a unit for the 
other." The Commission's ultimate conclusion in its Final 
Decision that "[w]hile the Petitioner may indeed have filed a 
consolidated sales tax return, it should have reported 
transactions between Harper Excavating and Harper Contracting" 
is inconsistent with its prehearing order, is inconsistent with 
§ 59-15-5(4), leads to a strained interpretation of that statute 
and should not be affirmed. 
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IV. THE COMMISSION MUST IMPOSE SALES TAX BASED UPON 
ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS OF OWNERSHIP, NOT UPON 
PETITIONERS' ERRONEOUS ACCOUNTING TREATMENT WHICH 
FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT OWNERSHIP, 
The Commission wrongly stated in its Final Decision 
that "the issue before the Commission is whether or not the 
manner in which the Petitioner accounted for the transactions 
between Harper Excavating and Harper Contracting with regard to 
the sale of sand and gravel constituted a taxable transaction." 
(R. 210) The issue is, having found that the underlying 
ownership of the property was inconsistent with the accounting 
procedures initially followed by the taxpayer, can the 
Commission nonetheless impose tax liability based upon that 
erroneous accounting treatment which is contrary to the factual 
findings. Respondent fails to recognize that the issue was 
purely a legal issue below and remains a purely legal issue on 
appeal. Instead, Respondent attempts to color this issue as a 
dispute of facts rather than law. 
In its brief, respondent spends several pages 
disputing the following factual issues: whether or not the 
gravel sales agreements and assignments conveyed a valid 
interest in real estate from Rulon Harper to Harper Contracting, 
Inc.;6 whether or not the Petitioners' controller erroneously 
6
 Respondent throws out various theories and arguments to 
challenge these agreements and assignments. It argues that the 
agreements were not notarized, recorded or contained on the books 
of the Petitioners. (Respondent's Brief, p. 25) Moreover, it 
argues that the assignment could be invalid under such theories as 
novation, subsequent assignment, prior assignment, breach of 
contract, lack of consideration, abandonment and mistake. 
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assigned the gravel pit materials to Harper Sand and Gravel, 
Inc. and; whether or not the transactions that were taxed 
involved gravel materials other than those covered by the gravel 
sales agreements and assignments. Contrary to the assertions in 
Respondent's brief, the facts are not in dispute. In fact, the 
Final Decision of the Commission sets forth or assumes all of 
these facts in Petitioners' favor. The Final Decision states 
that Harper Excavating, Inc. purchased the real estate interests 
from Rulon Harper prior to the reorganization, that Harper 
Contracting, Inc. succeeded to these real estate interests after 
the reorganization, and that Petitioners' controller "mistakenly 
assigned those assets to Harper Sand and Gravel." (R. 208-9, 
11 3, 6, 7 & 9) Moreover, it is clear from the record that both 
the parties and the Commission assumed that the gravel materials 
at issue in the sales tax determination were covered by the 
relevant agreements. Respondent has not appealed the findings 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-31) Respondent knows that these 
personal defenses to the contracts were not considered by the 
Commission. In fact, Respondent stipulated to the existence of 
these contracts (R. 566-567) and the Commission assumed their 
existence and validity (R. 208). Moreover, these same agreements 
and assignments govern the current operations of the Petitioners 
which have not resulted in sales tax since Petitioners' accounting 
procedures were changed. In any event, courts have held, for 
obvious reasons, that persons not parties to a contract cannot 
claim the parties' personal defenses and collaterally attack that 
contract. See, e.g., Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 
Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974) (third party could not 
assert uncertainty of terms); Jackson v. O'Neill. 181 Kan. 930, 
317 P.2d 440, 443 (1957) (third party could not assert lack of 
mutuality); Jenks Hatchery, Inc. v. Elliot, 252 Or. 25, 448 P.2d 
370, 373 (1968) (third party could not assert statute of frauds). 
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of fact of the Commission and it is improper for Respondent to 
question these facts in this appeal. 
The issue before this Court is not one of fact, but 
purely one of law. That issue is whether or not the initial 
accounting treatment applied to a particular transaction should 
control the tax liability or whether the factual realities of 
the transaction should control. The Commission concluded that 
the "manner in which the Petitioner accounted for the 
transactions" creates the tax liability and not necessarily the 
underlying facts. (R. 210) This cannot be the law. Tax 
liability cannot be predicated on accounting "shams" whether 
intentional or inadvertent. The United States Supreme Court has 
specifically recognized the accounting records "are no more than 
evidential, being neither indispensable nor conclusive.7 The 
[tax] decision must rest upon actual facts." Doyle v. Mitchell 
Bros, Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918). 
Respondent argues that "[t]he tax in this case is not 
based on mere paper transactions, but on real, concrete 
exchanges of tangible property for consideration between 
7
 Respondent argues that records are prima facie evidence 
of the facts they state. (Respondent's Brief, p. 23) Petitioners 
do not dispute this statement and do not fault the auditing 
division for its initial conclusion that taxable transactions had 
occurred. However, "[p]rima facie evidence does not establish a 
presumption; it merely meets the minimum quantum of evidence 
necessary for a party to prevail if the evidence remains 
unrebutted." Godesky v. Provo City Corp. . 690 P.2d 541, 547 (Utah 
1984) . Petitioners only fault respondent and the Commission for 
ignoring the realities of ownership and the transactions once they 
had been brought to light and the financial statements had been 
restated. 
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separate corporate entities." (Respondent's Brief at 24) They 
are wrong. The facts, as found by the Commission based on 
undisputed evidence, are to the contrary. It wais not the 
physical movement of the sand and gravel matericils that created 
the tax liability, but only the subsequent accounting treatment 
that mischaracterized those transactions. The fact is that 
nothing about the physical processing, movement and placing of 
gravel materials has changed between the time prior to the 
reorganization and today. The only thing that has changed is 
the paperwork accounting of those transactions. 
Since the audit, Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. has 
continued to extract, process, wash and stack gravel at the 
gravel pits. (Transcript at p. 117) Harper Excavating, Inc. 
has continued to take the gravel stacked by Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. and transport it to particular job sites. 
(Transcript at p. 117) Harper Contracting, Inc. has continued 
to take the gravel delivered by Harper Excavating, Inc. and 
placed it at the job site. (Transcript at p. 117) The only 
thing that has changed since the audit is the way these 
transactions are accounted for. Instead of Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. paying royalties to the pit owners, they are paid 
by Harper Contracting, Inc., the true owner of the gravel sales 
agreements. (Transcript at p. 101) Instead of Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. receiving payments for sales of gravel to Harper 
Excavating, Inc., they are paid a fee for processing the 
materials for Harper Contracting, Inc. (Transcript at p. 117) 
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Instead of Harper Excavating, Inc. receiving payments for sales 
of gravel to Harper Contracting, Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc. 
receives a fee for transporting the materials from the pits to 
the job site. (Transcript at p. 117) Moreover, contrary to 
Respondent's assertions, if Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. sells 
gravel directly to third persons, it first purchases the gravel 
from Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 102) Petitioners' records 
and procedures now accurately reflect the true ownership of the 
materials rather than the erroneous assumptions of the 
controller and these records and procedures have resulted in no 
additional sales tax liability.8 
It is absolutely imperative that sales taxes reflect 
the actual realities of ownership and sale. Taxpayers cannot by 
error or device account for transactions for tax, or other 
purposes, in a manner inconsistent with ownership and passage of 
title. In a different context, this Court has recently affirmed 
that "passage of title is the moment upon which the transaction 
is to be valued for the purposes of the tax." Hales, 842 P.2d 
at 891. Because Harper Contracting, Inc. always owned title to 
the gravel materials in this case, no taxable event could have 
occurred when Harper Excavating, Inc. physically delivered the 
8
 Petitioners again note that Respondent has recently 
audited their current records and procedures. That audit resulted 
in no additional sales tax despite the fact that Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. continues to process the pit materials, Harper 
Excavating, Inc. continues to transport the materials to the cite 
and Harper Contracting, Inc. continues to place the material at 
the job sites. (R. 26). For obvious reasons, Respondent has 
chosen not to comment about these later audits. 
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gravel from Harpers Sand and Gravel, Inc. to Hairper Contracting, 
Inc. It goes without saying that the Tax Commission would not 
honor sham transactions entered into to avoid tax liability. By 
parity of reasoning, the Tax Commission cannot be allowed to 
impose taxes when a taxpayer inadvertently uses erroneous 
accounting treatment. For this reason and all of the reasons 
stated in Petitioners' initial brief, the Court should reverse 
the Commission on this issue and order a refund of those taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners' reasonably concluded that they were a 
"group or combination acting as a unit" within the language of 
the applicable tax statutes. The Institutional Laundry and 
Hales cases cited by respondent did not address this issue and 
do not govern this case. The doctrine of "ejusdem generis" 
supports Petitioners' argument, not Respondent's. Respondent's 
arguments and the Commission's conclusions concerning the 
consolidated return are inapposite. Therefore, the Court should 
construe the statutes in Petitioners' favor and reverse the 
decision of the Tax Commission on this issue. 
The Court should decline to view the second issue in 
this case as a factual issue. The facts of this case are not 
disputed. The Court should reverse the decision of the 
Commission because the taxes imposed on Petitioners were based 
upon accounting treatment formulated in error that was 
inconsistent with the true ownership of the gravel materials as 
found by the Commission in its Final Order. 
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